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DISCRETE INFINITY AND THE SYNTAX-SEMANTICS 
INTERFACE 
Uli Sauerland1 and Pooja Paul2
Discrete infinity was identified as a central feature of human language by Humboldt who famously 
spoke of making infinite use of finite means. Later Chomsky refocused attention on this property 
starting with Chomsky (1957). In a number of works since, Chomsky has repeatedly stressed the 
centrality of infinity for understanding language.  For example, Chomsky (2007)  writes that “An 
I-language is a computational system that generates infinitely many internal expressions”. Chomsky
also noted that the property of discrete infinity is shared by the natural numbers and language. This
connection has also caught the interest of others in cognitive science (e.g. Dehaene 1999, Dehaene
et al. 1999). In this squib, we want to discuss concrete reductions of discrete infinity of the natural
number. Specifically, we want to investigate the extent to which this connection is compatible with
current views of the syntax-semantics interface. We argue that merge alone is not enough to derive
infinity, but a minimal lexicon is necessary, as Chomsky (2007) has noted in passing.  We furthermore
show that Chomsky’s assertion that a single lexical item is sufficient to generate the natural numbers
depends on two assumptions -- an untyped lambda calculus, and a specific interpretation of the
syntactic Merge operation.
In mathematics, the Peano axioms (or Peano-Dedekind axioms) represent one characterization of 
the natural numbers to a finite set of axioms. This formulation does not uniquely characterize the 
natural numbers, but also allows so-called “non-standard models” that satisfy Peano’s axioms.  Von 
Neumann’s set-theoretic construction of the natural numbers in (1) conceives of 0 as the empty set, 
and then constructs for any number n its successor s(n) by union of n with the singleton set n. This 
construction leverages the finite means of set theory to construct an infinity.
(1) standard set-theoretic construction of the the natural numbers
     0 = {}
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For the construction of natural numbers from language, it seems initially plausible that the internal 
structure of number words should be our guide. As Ionin and Matushansky (2006) argue, complex 
number words such as “two hundred and fifty three” can be analyzed as syntactically and semantically 
compositional. On their view, there is a finite set of simplex cardinals, which may vary across 
languages -- e.g. in “one”, to “nine”, but also “eleven”, “twelve”, and possibly “twenty”, “thirty” 
and other multiple of 10.  Among the simplex cardinals of English, some powers of 10 can acts 
as multiples -- “hundred”, “thousand”, “million”, “billion”, “trillion”, “quadrillion” to “nonillion”. 
Addition and multiplication are also part of Ionin and Matushansky’s system. The view I suggest 
goes beyond what Ionin and Matushansky propose, so the criticism I then make doesn’t impinge on 
their theory at all. Namely, I want to consider the idea that the concept of numbers is derived only 
through the internal structure of complex number words.  This would entail that without the syntax 
for complex number terms in the language only the numbers denoted by simplex terms would be 
accessible to mathematical thought. 
However, this view is not easy to sustain, because it would predict that for any speaker the number 
line should have an upper limit. Ionin and Matushansky stress that conventions constrain which 
number labels are actually used -- e.g. while “four hundred” is the valid label for ‘400’ in English, 
“twenty twenty” or “forty ten” are not. The conventionalization limits the productivity of the number 
system as afforded by the multiplication and addition operations. Crucially, this predicts an upper 
bound on the numbers for which a linguistic label can be constructed. In English, the sequence of 
powers of 1000 (“million”, “billion”, “trillion”, “quadrillion”, …) that are simplex expressions has an 
upper bound in most speakers’ knowledge. This would seem to predict that the numbers end at some 
point, perhaps at 999 nonillion 999 octillion 999 septillion 999 sextillion ....  But as far as we know, 
an English speaker wouldn’t conclude that the numbers themselves end. Instead speakers are aware 
of the fact that the English language, or their knowledge of it, merely runs out of words to denote 
numbers at some point.
This entails that the reduction of number to language must rely more directly on the internal operations 
of language, in particular Merge. Chomsky (2007) suggests that “If the lexicon is reduced to a single 
element, then Merge can yield arithmetic in various ways.” Chomsky himself doesn’t elaborate on 
this interesting remark. First consider Chomsky’s implicit claim that in the absence of a lexicon, 
Merge cannot yield discrete infinity. If merge was simply set formation, this would not be the case.  A 
construction analogous to that of Peano above would suffice: since the lexicon is empty, merge could 
at the base step only apply to an empty input, yielding the empty set as its output. But then the empty 
set could be the input for Merge yielding {{}}, and furthermore a discrete infinity of representations. 
But Chomsky has repeatedly argued that the “simplest case” of Merge ought to be restricted to no 
fewer than two inputs (Chomsky, 2007). Chomsky makes the natural assumption that this restriction 
of Merge blocks the application of Merge to an empty set.
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While this rules out the von Neumann construction of the natural numbers for language, Chomsky 
suggests in the same paper that a single element in the lexicon suffices to yield the natural numbers. 
Thus, Merge would need to apply in the simplest case to just a single lexical element - still an apparent 
contradiction with Merge only applying to two elements. But, the case of a single element lexicon 
seems different from that of an empty lexicon. We think there are two possible ways to understand 
Chomsky’s remark, both of which ultimately amount to similar results. On the one hand, one lexical 
item may yield multiple occurrences, X_1 and X_2, when it is copied from the lexicon to the syntactic 
system. Then X_1 and X_2 can be merged, yielding {X_1, X_2}. This system works, but is perhaps 
a bit worrying in its reliance on not only the lexicon, but furthermore its dependence on the operation 
that creates different, possibly infinitely many “occurrences” from the same element of the lexicon. 
In more recent work, Starke (2001), Citko (2005), Fox & Johnson (2015) and others have sought 
in different ways to reduce the scope of occurrence creation. An alternative to keep in mind for the 
natural numbers, is an application of Merge that Guimarães (2000) has called “self-merge”.  Assume 
that X is the single unique element of the lexicon, then self-merge of X to X would produce the set 
{X, X}.  Formally {X, X} is not distinct from {X}, but as we discuss below, we assume that the 
language system is built to regard any node constructed via merge as having two daughters. This 
predicts the representation of the result of self-merge to be {X, X}. Once {X, X} is constructed in 
this way, subsequent merge can now construct a discrete infinity by merging {X, {X, X}} and so on. 
Whether we distinguish multiple occurrences or not, the system then generates from a single lexical 
item, a discrete infinity of representations.
Let us now consider how Chomsky’s reduction of the numbers to language could be mapped at the 
syntax-semantics interface. For concreteness, we assume following Heim & Kratzer (1998) that only 
a restricted set of composition principles may apply at the syntax semantics interface. In particular, 
the two possible composition rules are Function Application and Predicate Modification, as stated 
in (ii), because all other composition rules that Heim & Kratzer discuss don’t apply:  the lambda 
abstraction rule applies only if one of the nodes is a variable abstractor, which X isn’t, and all other 
interpretation rules apply only to primitive nodes (i.e. not the results of merge). We think though that 
ultimately our results are independent of this assumption.
(i) The interpretation of a node C is given either by:
   a. functional application, namely, if {A, B} = C, then [[C]] = [[A]]([[B]]), or
   b. predicate modification, namely, if {A, B} = C, then [[C]] = λ x . [[A]](x) and [[B]](x)
The interesting consequence of Chomsky’s proposal is that the interpretation of the single lexical 
item X must combine with itself. Neither of the two interpretation rules in (i) gives the right result: 
self-combination of [[X]] with [[X]] by Predicate Modification (ib) is inadequate, since [[X X]] 
reduces trivially to [[X]] by the idempotency of conjunction. Function Application [[X]]([[X]]) is 
necessarily undefined in the typed lambda calculus that Heim & Kratzer use because, if [[X]] is of 
type α, it cannot take an argument of type α. In some of the theoretical literature, the typed calculus is 
extended to systems with polymorphic types. It is possible that such polymorphic-type system could 
overcome the limitation noted in the text. A less rigid system, namely property theory, that allows 
self-application, has been discussed for natural language semantics in earnest only by Chierchia & 
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Turner (1988) to account for cases of apparent self-application such as (ii).
(ii) a. Nicety is nice.
     b. Goodness is good.
However, it is difficult to see how such an account should be extended to the natural numbers, and 
furthermore this account of cases like (i) has not been accepted widely in the field. Furthermore, the 
intuitions about the interpretation of such sentences are not very sharp -- it is quite conceivable that 
the speakers don’t conclude from (ii-a) that the property of “nicety” itself is nice, but only that it’s nice 
if people are nice. Suppose a linguist struggles with the vague concept of “nicety”, but likes concepts 
such as “round” and “square” -- the latter she calls “nice” concepts, while she regards “nicety” as 
horrible. At the same time, she finds nice people very nice. It is still conceivable that such a person 
might truthfully utter (i-a). This obviously is not a knock-down argument against this approach, 
since it may just be a case of domain restriction of the quantifier, and as such, still compatible with 
Chomsky’s proposal. In any event, we pursue a different type of proposal for the natural numbers.
Concretely, we think the Church numerals provide a natural fit for the construction of the natural 
number system, given the prominence of lambda calculus in semantics.  We provide the definition 
of the Church numbers 0 and 1, as well as the successor function in (iii). As can be seen, their 
construction relies on the lambda calculus.  
(iii)  a. [[0]] = λ f. λ x . x  
 b. [[1]] = λ f . λ x . f(x)
 c.  successor(n) = λ n λ f λ x  . f ( n (f) (x))
With Church numbers, the number of bound occurrences of f that apply recursively to the variable x 
corresponds to the number value of a term. The numbers 2 and 3 are given in (iv).
(iv) [[2]] = [[successor(1)]]  = λ f . λ x . f(f(x))
      [[3]] = [[successor(2)]] = λ f . λ x . f(f(f(x)))
As such the Church numbers still require at least two basic lexical symbols, for example “successor” 
and “1”, to derive the natural number series. But, by making the composition more flexible, it is 
possible to arrive at a more flexible system. One possibility is to allow addition as a composition rule. 
Addition is standardly defined as in (v).
(v) [[addition]] =  λ n λ m λ f λ x . m(f) ( n(f) (x))
With that we can state a new composition rule for binary branching nodes, with sub-constituent 
meanings n and m as [[addition]](n)(m). This leads us to a system where [[1 1]] = [[2]], and for any 
complex merged structure S of 1’s, the semantic value of S corresponds to the number of terminal 
1-nodes in the tree. One interesting consequence of this proposal is that numbers greater than or equal 
to four don’t have one unique representation, but rather can be represented in two or more different 
ways. For three and smaller numbers, this isn’t the case, assuming that the merged tree structures 
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aren’t linearize. Consider the one possible representation of “three” and two distinct representations 
of “four” in (vi)
(vi)  a. “three” = [ [ 1  1 ] 1 ] 
      b. “four” =  [ [ 1 1 ] [ 1 1 ] ] ,    [ [ [ 1 1 ] 1 ] 1 ] 
The ambiguity of “four” and the higher numbers on this implementation is an interesting, and we believe 
novel, observation. It could predict that identity statements such as “four equals four” could be judged 
false. This clearly would be a disadvantage of this implementation of the number system, but we do 
not think it a necessary consequence. Instead of requiring “equals” to demand identity of structural 
representation, it is more faithful to our view to only require identity of interpretation. In this case, “four 
equals four” is a necessary truth since both representations are interpreted as “λ f λ x . f ( f ( f ( f (x) ) ) 
)”. Then an attractive prediction of this view of numbers is that it leads us to expect that manipulating 
numbers up to three ought to be cognitively easier than it is for numbers greater than three.
A second, alternative implementation of the numbers would not adopt a new composition rule, but 
instead propose a lexical ambiguity of the basic number, which we’ll call “ONE” for this account. 
The proposal is as in (v): “ONE” can either represent “1” or the successor function, and the correct 
interpretation is determined by the structural context. 
(v) [[ONE]] = { λ f . λ x . f(x), λ n λ f λ x . f ( n (f) (x)) }
We assume that “two” is represented as the result of merging ONE with itself, as in (vi); however, 
the two occurrences of “ONE” must be interpreted differently: one of them as 1, the other as the 
successor function. The two occurrences have the same status in every sense, so we cannot say which 
one receives which of the two interpretations.  However, it is necessarily the case that they receive 
different interpretations. The possibility of different interpretations in a case of self-merge are to our 
mind, a bit surprising, but we do not know of any other evidence regarding the interpretation of self-
merged structure.
(vi) “two”: [[ ONE ONE ]] = successor (1) = lambda f . lambda x . f(f(x))
The proposal in (v), in contrast to the addition-rule, does not predict an ambiguity for any numerals. 
For instance, “four” must be represented as the second structure in (vii), since the first one is 
uninterpretable.
(vii) [ [ ONE ONE ] [ ONE ONE ] ]: uninterpretable
      “four” = [ ONE [ ONE [ ONE ONE ] ] ] 
But one may ask here whether the proposal of a two-way lexical ambiguity isn’t really simply a way 
of packing two lexical items into one morpheme, and therefore departing from Chomsky’s idea of 
using only a single lexical item to generate the full set of natural numbers. The proposal then more 
accurately should be represented as assuming two lexical items: 1 and the successor function.
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One final possibility to consider is to view the ambiguity of (v) as the result of a general type-ambiguity 
similar to the type ambiguity proposed for connectives by Rooth & Partee (1982) among others. This 
though would lead us to expect a further ambiguity of ONE in at least three ways, as in (viii).
(viii) [[ONE]] =  { λ f . λ x . f(x),
                        λ n λ f λ x  . f ( n (f) (x)),
                        λ m λ n λ f λ x . m( f ) ( n (f) (x)) }
The third lexical entry for ONE in (viii) represents the function composition of addition and 1, and 
therefore can combined with two numerals n and m resulting in a representation of n + m + 1.This 
proposal predicts again that “four” and higher numerals are ambiguous: If we represent the three 
interpretations listed for ONE in (viii) as ONE_1, ONE_2, and ONE_3 in that order, we see that the 
type resolution represented in (ix) renders the structure [ [ ONE ONE ] [ ONE ONE ] ] interpretable.
(ix)  [ [ ONE ONE ] [ ONE ONE ] ] =  [ [ ONE_3 ONE_1 ] [ ONE_2 ONE_1 ] ]
We conclude that Chomsky’s proposal to represent the natural numbers in language by the use 
of a single lexical item has an interesting consequence: Numbers greater than “three” must have 
ambiguous representations. This is not the case if we represent numbers with two lexical items, 1 
and the successor function. The difference between the proposals relates to the fact that starting 
with a single lexical item requires us to assume that both syntactic and semantic composition must 
be more flexible: self-merge must be possible and a new way of composition must be assumed. The 
proposal assuming two lexical items can do without such flexibility.  The two proposals can thus be 
distinguished by either investigating further the independent evidence that has be adduced in favor 
of such compositional flexibility.  But a second possibility is to directly target the prediction that the 
“unambiguous” numbers up to three should be easier to process as compared to the “ambiguous” 
numbers four and greater.
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